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Abstract
In this paper, we use unique firm-level data to calculate a monetary value of 
the firm-specific component of German apprenticeship training. We do this by 
comparing the initial productivities and wages of externally recruited and in-
ternally trained workers in the same job, occupation and firm. We argue that 
the resources needed to increase the productivity of externally recruited workers 
to the level of internally trained workers are an adequate measure of the firm-
specificity of training. We also calculate the firm-specific component as a 
share of total investment in human capital during apprenticeship training. Our 
results support the view that German apprenticeship training is mainly gen-
eral, with an average specific share of 12% of total human capital investments. 
The share, however, increases with firm size and differs between occupational 
fields.
JEL Classification: J24
Keywords: Apprenticeship training, costs and benefits of training, firm-specific 
human capital
1.	 	Introduction
Classical human capital theory (Becker, 1962) claims that under perfect market con-
ditions firms do not invest in general human capital. In response to this claim, Ace-
moglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, b) develop a model explaining why firms may 
have incentives to do so. As an empirical example, the authors refer to the case of 
apprenticeship training in Germany, for which several surveys have shown that, on 
average, firms bear substantial training costs (von Bardeleben et al., 1995; Beicht et 
al., 2004; Schönfeld et al., 2010). An important assumption made by Acemoglu and 
Pischke is that apprenticeship training generates mainly general skills because ap-
prentices are required to follow a prescribed curriculum, take an outside examination 
at the end of the training period and receive a nationally recognised certificate issued 
* Corresponding author: harald.pfeifer@bibb.de. The authors thank Hans Heijke, Ben Kriechel, Günter 
Walden, Stefan C. Wolter and an anonymous referee, as well as the participants in the 14th Collo-
quium on Personnel Economics held in Zurich on the 9th to 11th of February 2011 and in the 2nd 
Congress on Research in Vocational Education and Training held in Berne/Zollikofen on the 23rd to 
25th of March 2011, for helpful comments.
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by the respective industry or craft chamber. In practice, however, it is possible for 
firms to influence the content of apprenticeship training. In the dual system of train-
ing, apprentices spend only one or two days of the working week in a vocational 
school. During the remainder of the week, training takes place within the firm, giv-
ing firms substantial scope to foster skills that are specific to the firm. Consequently, 
it is possible that at least a fraction of the skills obtained during apprenticeship train-
ing in a firm are not directly transferable to other firms. While firm investment in 
German apprenticeship training has been extensively analysed in the surveys refer-
enced above, the degree of firm-specificity of training has not yet been estimated 
directly on the basis of representative firm-level data.
In addition to the fact that the degree of firm-specificity of apprenticeship training 
is interesting from a scientific perspective, the results presented in this paper may 
also be important from a political point of view. For a long time, the primary goal of 
political leadership and social partners has been to offer young apprentices a trans-
parent and transferable education. Since the early 1990s, however, the call for more 
freedom in tailoring apprenticeship training to individual firms’ skill needs has in-
tensified, and this has led to the adoption of less stringent training regulations. The 
question arises of whether German firms have, in general, taken advantage of the 
freedom so provided to introduce firm-specific elements in their training to safe-
guard their human capital investments against the risk of poaching in increasingly 
competitive labour and product markets.
In this paper, we use data from the Cost-Benefit-Survey (CBS) conducted by the 
Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) of 2007 to calculate 
a monetary value for the firm-specific component of German apprenticeship train-
ing. We compare the initial productivity and wages of externally recruited workers 
to those of internally trained workers in cases where both groups have been trained 
in the same occupation, perform the same type of job and are employed in the same 
firm. We argue that the amount of a firm’s resources that is needed to raise the pro-
ductivity of externally recruited workers to the level of those who were trained inter-
nally provides a good measure of the magnitude of the firm-specific training compo-
nent. Because both externally recruited and internally trained workers are required 
to pass a standardised, external examination in their respective occupations (BMBF, 
2005), we make the explicit assumption that apprentices in the same occupation re-
ceive a similar amount of general and occupation-specific training.1 Consequently, 
differences in productivity between internally trained and externally recruited workers 
in the same type of job, occupation and firm must result from differences in the en-
dowment of non-transferable, i.e. firm-specific, skills. To estimate the monetary 
value of this specific component, we use firm-level information on the relative pro-
ductivity, adjustment time, direct and indirect continuing training costs and wages 
received by the respective groups of workers. In a second step, we calculate the spe-
cific training component as a share of the firms’ total investment in human capital 
1	 Occupation-specific	skills	are	treated	as	de facto	general	human	capital	in	this	paper	because	these	
skills	can	also	be	transferred	to	other	firms	employing	persons	with	the	same	occupation..
How large is the firm-specific component of German apprenticeship training? 87
generated by apprenticeship training. We approximate the total investment based on 
the costs of training personnel, training infrastructure and training organisation. Fi-
nally, we use a Heckman-type selection model to regress the share of firm-specific 
training on a number of explanatory variables to analyse its determinants.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we reflect upon 
theoretical aspects of the problem and briefly discuss the relevant literature. In sec-
tion 3, we describe the data source and the method used to calculate the absolute 
value of firm-specific training components and the gross cost of training. Our em-
pirical strategy and selection issues are discussed in section 4. The results are given 
in section 5, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2.	 Theoretical	background	and	literature
Becker (1962) concluded from a theoretical analysis that firms would refrain from 
investment in general training. To recoup the costs related to general training, firms 
would need to pay trained workers wages below their marginal product. In a perfect 
labour market, workers would not accept this and would move to a firm willing to 
pay the market wage. In the case of firm-specific training, in contrast, it is rational 
for firms to invest in training because the additional skills acquired by workers dur-
ing such training are applicable only in the training firm and do not increase the 
marginal product elsewhere. In this case, the firm can pay wages below the workers’ 
marginal product and in this way recoup the cost of training.2 Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998, 1999a, b), among others, have argued that firm investment in general human 
capital is rational if a) labour market frictions distort the equality of wages and pro-
ductivity and b) a compressed wage structure leads to an increasing gap between 
wages and productivity along the training dimension. Firms are thus able to reap a 
benefit from general training without risking the loss of trained workers to another 
firm. Leuven (2005) supplies an overview of the relevant theories with respect to 
private sector training. Wolter and Ryan (2011) offer a comprehensive survey of 
theoretical and empirical issues related to apprenticeship training.
An important question discussed in the aftermath of Becker’s work is whether it 
is possible to distinguish between general and firm-specific skills. According to 
Bishop (1996), all skills may be general, but each worker has a particular mix of 
skills. This mix may be more useful to the current employer than to alternative em-
ployers, and this encourages the employer to invest in the skill mix that she requires. 
Lazear (2009) formalises this argument in his «Skill-Weights Approach».3 Similarly, 
Stevens (1994) argues that, in practice, skills are neither completely general nor 
2 Becker (1962) and later Hashimoto (1981) argue that the investment in firm-specific human capital is 
shared between the worker and the firm.
3 Although this paper focuses on the firm-specific training component, we could easily transfer the 
analysis to this strand of thought. The absolute value of raising the productivity of an externally re-
cruited worker and its share in total human capital investments, which is calculated in section 4, could 
be interpreted as the productivity loss due to differences between the skill mix needed by the firm and 
the mix offered by the recruited worker.
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purely specific. This mixture of skills makes the outside market for workers non-
competitive and therefore fosters firm investment in training. Franz and Soskice 
(1995) and Kessler and Lülfesmann (2006) point out that from the employer’s point 
of view, general and specific skills may be complementary. Teaching firm-specific 
skills may reduce the cost of also teaching general skills and vice versa. As empirical 
evidence for firm investment in general training, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 
1999a, b) refer to the German apprenticeship system.4 A series of micro-level sur-
veys has shown that firms incur substantial net costs when training apprentices (von 
Bardeleben et al., 1995; Beicht et al., 2004). The most recent of these surveys for the 
reference year 2007, which also provides the data for the analysis conducted in this 
paper, confirms these results (Schönfeld et al., 2010).5 One of the few studies that 
directly identifies firm-specificity is that of Schweri (2006), who uses the Swiss data 
set on costs and benefits of vocational training (reference year 2000) to analyse the 
impact of the degree of firm-specificity on training decisions and training costs. He 
finds that firm-specificity has no significant impact on the training decisions of firms. 
Furthermore, he finds no clear evidence that a higher degree of firm-specificity in-
duces firms to accept higher training costs.6
In addition to the Swiss study, a number of studies have analysed the importance 
of firm-specific training in German apprenticeship training. Most of these studies 
investigate labour market outcomes, such as wages and mobility of former appren-
tices, to draw conclusions about the relative importance of the firm-specific training 
component. Werwatz (1996) finds that apprentices who leave the training firm expe-
rience no substantial earnings loss compared to apprentices who remain in the firm. 
He concludes that overall, apprenticeship training does not have a strong firm-spe-
cific component. For large firms in the industry sector of the economy, however, the 
firm-specific component seems to be higher than in small firms in the craft sector. 
Clark (2001) and Clark and Fahr (2002) show that former apprentices experience no 
significant wage cuts after moving to another firm, at least if they stay within their 
broad occupational group. The authors conclude that apprenticeship training is high-
ly transferable and thus mainly general. Korpi and Mertens (2003) also deduce from 
their analysis of mobility patterns in Germany and Sweden that «the proportion of 
truly firm-specific skills acquired during a German apprenticeship is rather low in 
relation to the transferable skills obtained» (p. 613). Euwals and Winkelmann (2004) 
confirm previously published studies in that they find no systematic wage differen-
tial between stayers and movers. On the other hand, Bougheas and Georgellis (2004)
find that apprentices who leave the training firm experience an earnings loss that the 
4 Autor (2001) provides empirical evidence for general training investments by temporary help agen-
cies in the United States.
5 Using the two latest BIBB-CBS waves, Pfeifer et al. (2010) show that net training costs have dropped 
significantly, even when controlling for structural changes and business cycle variations.
6 As a proxy for firm-specificity, Schweri uses the product of adaption time in months and the relative 
productivity of externally recruited workers. Although these measures are also important factors in the 
calculation in the present paper, we calculate the cost for adaption using the respective wages, as for-
malised in section 3.2.
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authors attribute to the loss of firm-specific human capital. However, movers’ earn-
ings grow at a faster rate than those of stayers over the time spent in the labour 
market. Using Lazear’s «Skill-Weights Approach», Backes-Gellner et al. (2010) find 
that the more specific the skill portfolio in an occupation is, the higher the net costs 
firms bear for apprenticeship training in the respective occupations. The same ana-
lytical framework is used by Geel and Backes-Gellner (2011) to analyse the specifi-
city of skill combinations of various occupations and the effects of such specificity 
on occupational mobility and wages.
An important drawback of a number of the cited studies is that movers can stay 
within a broad occupational group but perform a different type of job that requires a 
different set of skills. Thus, the loss in earnings of movers compared to stayers may 
be attributable to the fact that some movers cannot use the full set of general skills 
obtained in the training firm. In addition, firms may be forced, through collective 
bargaining agreements for example, to accept lower productivity during the recruited 
workers’ adjustment period without being able to adjust wages accordingly. In addi-
tion, (lower) wages are only one part of the story. Costs for continuing training meas-
ures aimed to increase the productivity of newly hired workers are not accounted for 
in the above studies. Consequently, there could be a loss of firm-specific human 
capital of movers that is not reflected in their initial wages. 
To contribute to the existing literature in this area, the present paper draws from 
rich data on the wage and productivity differences of internally trained and exter-
nally recruited workers. Further training costs for externally recruited workers are 
also measured in detail. Finally, we are able to observe movers and stayers not only 
in the same occupation and firm but also performing the same type of job. We there-
by avoid some of the drawbacks of the studies cited above. The data source used and 
the construction of variables are described in detail in the subsequent section.
3.	 Data	source	and	calculation	method
3.1 BIBB-Cost-Benefit-Survey
The data used in our analysis stem from the 4th BIBB-Cost-Benefit-Survey (BIBB-
CBS) conducted for the reference year 2007. Representatives from a total of 2958 
firms answered a detailed questionnaire during a computer-assisted personal inter-
view (CAPI). The respondents were usually firm employees responsible for the 
training of apprentices and/or were personnel managers. In the case of small firms, 
the interview partners often were the owners of the business. The data set contains 
unique information about the firms’ training costs and benefits, and the firms were 
asked to supply information about one specific occupation trained. Altogether, 51 of 
the most common occupations were surveyed.
In addition to providing cost information, firms that had recruited already-trained 
workers from the external labour market over the last three years answered a set of 
additional questions. The answers to these questions provided information on pro-
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ductivity and wage differences between externally recruited and internally trained 
workers. In addition, detailed information about the adjustment time and continuing 
training costs for externally recruited workers was given. In the descriptive analysis 
of the data, we focus on the subset of firms that recruited workers from the external 
labour market to fill positions in which they performed jobs similar to those of inter-
nally trained workers. This data set includes about 800 firms. Descriptive informa-
tion about this sample and the entire sample of firms is given in table A1.
3.2 Variable construction
In an initial step, we calculate an indicator of total investment in human capital dur-
ing apprenticeship training for the single firm THCi. The indicator includes three 
main components. The first component is the cost of training personnel involved in 
the training of apprentices. For this component, we use information about the aver-
age hours,  h i 
t, that trainers spend with apprentices and multiply these by the hourly 
wage,  w i 
t , of trainers. Trainers can either be full-time training staff, unskilled work-
ers, skilled workers or members of the firm’s management. For each of these sub-
groups of trainers, we draw on separate information for hours spent and wages paid.
The second component entails costs for the firm that are related to the infrastructure 
of training, Ii. Firms can have separate training centres in which apprentices can prac-
tice. Several firms make use of internal classroom teaching. The rent and costs for 
maintenance, equipment and furniture of these facilities are included in the costs for 
infrastructure. We also include costs for tools, machines and materials used in training.
The third component consists of costs related to the organisation, coordination 
and administration of training, Oi. This indicator takes account of costs for external 
training courses and administrative costs for apprentices. These three components 
can be used to calculate the total investment in human capital over the entire appren-
ticeship period of three (or three and one-half) years for firm i. Formalising the cal-
culation of THCi yields the following equation:
THCi =  h i 
t  w i 
t + Ii + Oi (1)
Table A2 displays the respective monetary values for both samples of firms. It is 
important to note that the indicator THCi cannot be compared to the indicator of 
gross costs of training used in Schönfeld et al. (2010) because the methods used to 
calculate the two indicators differ. The indicator of human capital investments that is 
presented here excludes wages paid to the apprentices because these wage costs are 
not directly linked to human capital formation but rather could be viewed as com-
pensation for the productive contribution of apprentices. In addition, the indicator in 
this paper has a higher value of costs for training personnel because all hours spent 
with the apprentice are valued with the respective wages of trainers. In the gross 
costs calculated in Schönfeld et al. (2010), only training hours are considered to lead 
to costs, which effectively reduces the productivity of trainers. We use this method 
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of calculation because our aim is to develop an indicator approximating the mone-
tary «input» into human capital formation rather than to focus on a pure cost-benefit 
description of training from the firms’ perspective.
In the second step of the calculation, our main variable of interest, the monetary 
indicator for firm-specificity of apprenticeship training on the firm level SHCi, is 
constructed. For the calculation of SHCi, we first calculate the adjustment costs over 
the time during which the externally recruited worker is in the firm but has a lower 
productivity than an internally trained worker. To do this, we use information about 
the relative productivity level  p ti 
r of the externally recruited worker in month t;  p ti 
r has 
a value between 0 and 1.7 The productivity difference between the two groups of 
workers is then defined as 1 −  p ti 
r. Using information about the wage  w i 
ex of the exter-
nally recruited worker, we then calculate the adjustment costs for each month t over 
the period of adjustment ai, which is also available in the data set.8 In this model, we 
assume that the externally recruited worker’s productivity improves linearly over the 
adjustment period. Adjustment costs  c i 
a for the individual firm are thus determined by
 c i 
a =  ∑ 
t = 1
 
ai
 ( w 
i
 ex −  w 
i
 int *  p ti 
r) (2)
Note that equation 2 is an approximation of
 c i 
a =  ∑ 
t = 1
 
ai
 (( φ i 
int −  w 
i
 int ) – ( φ ti 
ex –  w i 
ex )) (3)
where  φ i 
int is the productivity of internally trained workers and  φ ti 
ex =  φ i 
int *  p ti 
r is the
productivity of externally recruited workers in month t. Because  φ i 
int is unknown and 
assumed to be constant over time, we approximate the productivity of internally 
trained workers by their wage.9 Furthermore, direct costs and indirect costs for con-
tinuing training are calculated; the direct costs,  c i 
d , consist of fees and expenses for 
the firm, and the indirect wage costs  c i 
w are the wage costs arising from the absence 
of the externally recruited workers during external training. Continuing training 
costs are then given by:
 c i 
t =  c i 
d +  c i 
w (4)
The monetary indicator for the firm-specific component of training, then, is the sum 
of adjustment costs and further training costs:
6 The exact wording of the question is the following: «How much lower is the productivity of the exter-
nally recruited worker compared to that of the internally trained worker in the same (or similar) oc-
cupation working in the same (or similar) type of job at the beginning of the adjustment time?»
7 The exact wording of the question is the following: «How long (in months) does the adjustment pe-
riod of the externally recruited worker last?»
8 Because in imperfect labour markets wages could be below productivity, a different set of results 
could be obtained for the adjustment cost value and the estimate of the firm-specific training compo-
nent. We therefore offer a set of alternative calculations in sections 4 and 5 and in the appendix.
92 H. Pfeifer, G. Schönfeld & F. Wenzelmann
SHCi =  c i 
a +  c i 
t (5)
Finally, the monetary indicator for the firm-specific training component is divided by 
the total investment in human capital, yielding the share of the firm-specific compo-
nent sharei.
sharei = SHCi  ⁄ THCi (6)
Table A3 provides descriptive information on the relevant variables for the sample 
of recruiting firms.
4.	 Empirical	strategy
4.1 Precision of estimates
The strategy employed is to first calculate the share of firm-specificity and compare 
it across a number of structural variables. However, before discussing the results, we 
need to address potential problems associated with the precision of our estimates. 
The calculation method proposed in this paper applies only under the assumption 
that, on average, apprentices who pass the outside training examination in a specific 
occupation possess similar stocks of general and occupation-specific human capital 
and that internally trained workers differ from externally recruited workers only with 
respect to their firm-specific skills. The method also relies on the assumption that 
internally trained and externally recruited workers do not differ systematically in 
innate ability and motivation. Because the data at hand offer no information about 
the employment history of externally recruited workers, these are strong assump-
tions; they can be challenged by arguing that the more able apprentices tend to stay 
in the training firm while the less able (i.e. the «lemons») are released onto the labour 
market. On the other hand, the average ability of externally recruited workers could 
be higher than that of internally trained workers if the former group consists mainly 
of «poached» workers. In such a case, the firm-specific training component may in 
fact be larger than is estimated below. However, if the average ability of externally 
recruited workers is lower than that of internally trained workers, our results can be 
interpreted as an upper bound for the share of the firm-specific component.
Another point to be discussed at this stage is the lack of data on the productivity 
of internally trained employees. In section 3.2, we valued productivity differences 
with the wage of the internally trained employee. Models of imperfect competition 
predict, however, that wages paid by firms are below the workers’ productivity. If 
this is the case, our value for the adjustment costs  c i 
a of firm i would be underesti-
mated. Apart from the baseline calculations discussed below, we therefore recalcu-
lated the model, assuming differences between productivity and wages of 10%, 25% 
and 50%. The results are given in table A6 and are briefly discussed below.
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4.2 Sample selection model
For the second step of the empirical strategy, the analysis of the determinants of 
firm-specificity in a regression framework, we must take into account that restricting 
the analysis to a subsample of training firms that have recruited personnel over the 
last three years (i.e. from 2005 to 2007) may cause a selectivity problem. It is pos-
sible that the samples we have chosen to represent recruiting and non-recruiting 
firms differ not only in observed but also in unobserved characteristics that also re-
late to the firm-specific component of training. An unobserved variable could be, for 
example, the specialisation of firms in niche products. Recruiting personnel from the 
external labour market would be too costly for such firms because the production of 
niche products requires highly specific skills that are difficult to learn within an ac-
ceptable time period. It would be more beneficial for such firms to train apprentices 
and use the time the apprentices spend in the firm to invest in production-specific 
skills. In this case, specialising in niche products would be an omitted variable that 
impacts (negatively) the likelihood that the firm will recruit workers from the exter-
nal labour market and at the same time impacts (positively) the share of firm-specific 
training. Neglecting such a relationship, if present, would lead to underestimation of 
the firm-specificity of training due to sample selection.
In order to obtain consistent estimates, we therefore follow a maximum-likeli-
hood selection model frequently used in the literature (see Heckman, 1979). In this 
model, the selection variable is the recruitment of trained workers and the main de-
pendent variable is the share of firm-specific training. To identify the model, we need 
to include exclusion restriction variables in the selection equation. The choice of 
such variables is delicate in the sense that they should be both theoretically well 
founded and statistically valid, i.e. they must be correlated with the recruitment of 
trained workers from the external labour market but must not be correlated with the 
share of firm-specific training.
We choose two variables that measure a) the development of the workforce in the 
firm and b) whether or not the firm was able to fill all vacant apprenticeship-training 
slots during the past three years. The reason for choosing variable a) is that the in-
crease in the number of workers reflects the economic success of the firm and should 
be highly correlated with external recruitment but not with the firm-specific compo-
nent of apprenticeship training. The reason for choosing variable b) is that firms that 
could not fill all training slots are more likely to recruit from the external labour 
market. At the same time, the fact that a firm could not fill all its available training 
slots is not likely to be correlated with the firm-specific component of training.
However, it could be the case that, in the situation of a tight labour market, firms 
recruit workers that are less qualified because an insufficient number of workers with 
matching qualifications are available. The productivity of such employees would be 
lower than the productivity of those with a better qualification match. This scenario 
would lead to higher adjustment costs and a larger share of firm-specific human 
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capital. A similar argument applies with respect to the variable of unfilled training 
slots. Firms that are not able to fill all training slots could be firms that are less attrac-
tive to qualified workers on the labour market. These firms may be forced to recruit 
workers with lower ability than firms without problems filling apprenticeship vacan-
cies. Again, the firm-specific component would be larger. In both cases, the inde-
pendence of our exclusion restriction from firm-specificity would be violated.
To address this problem, we supply unemployment and open vacancy time series 
statistics from the Federal Employment Agency in Germany (see figure A1). The 
reference years for our sample are the three years prior to the survey, i.e. the years 
2005 to 2007. As the figure indicates, unemployment fell from 2005 onwards from 
an all-time peak of close to 5 million registered unemployed to under 4 million reg-
istered unemployed. At the same time, job vacancies registered at the Federal Em-
ployment Agency increased over that period from a relatively low level. In total, the 
figure indicates that unemployment was still substantial and that job vacancies were 
not extraordinarily high during the reference period; this does not lend support to the 
idea that labour markets were especially tight at that time. We further make use of a 
survey question that aims to measures the availability of skilled workers on the ex-
ternal labour market from the viewpoint of the single firm.10 The correlation between 
this variable and our measures for productivity and the share of firm-specific training 
is close to zero (0.008 and 0.013, respectively). Thus, the availability of skilled 
workers on the external labour market is statistically not related to our outcome 
measures. Finally, we check whether our exclusion restriction variables are corre-
lated with productivity and firm-specificity. Table A4 shows that this is not the case. 
The correlation between the two selection variables and the outcome variables is 
close to zero. On the basis of this information, we conclude that our exclusion re-
strictions are valid instruments for identifying our model.
In addition to the exclusion restriction variables, we include a set of explanatory 
variables, such as firm size (four categories) and region. We also add two institu-
tional variables. The first is a dummy indicating the existence of a works council in 
the firm, and the second indicates whether the firm is bound to collective wage 
agreements. Because the number of cases for some of the 51 occupations included in 
the survey is relatively low, we aggregate the occupational information according to 
the common classification of occupations. This classification results in 12 occupa-
tional groups; these groups are also included in the set of explanatory variables.
5.	 Results
Table 1 displays the results of the calculation of firms’ total investment in human 
capital during apprenticeship training THC (column 1) and the monetary value of the 
firm-specific component SHC (column 2). In column 3, the calculated firm-specific 
component of apprenticeship training is presented as share of total investment 
9 The exact wording of the question is: «How would you judge the number of available skilled workers 
in the training occupation?» Answering options were from 1 «very good» to 5 «very poor».
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(share). On average, the share of firm-specific training is relatively low, with a value 
of 12%. Differentiating between firms of different sizes shows that apprenticeship 
training in large firms with more than 500 employees is more specific than training 
in small firms with up to 10 employees. While the average value for the former is 
21%, the firm-specific component for the latter is about 9% of total human capital 
investments. Notable differences also exist with respect to occupational groups. 
Firms that train workers in health occupations such as medical assistant or dental 
assistant and occupations in the fields of accommodation and food, such as cook or 
baker, have a low share of firm-specificity in training of about 6%. For firms that 
train workers in occupations such as banking and insurance or chemicals, this meas-
ure is relatively high (25% and 21%, respectively). Differences in firm-specificity by 
region are negligible, whereas firms with a works council have relatively high firm-
specific training components.
Table 1: Firm investment in human capital 
and the firm-specific component of apprenticeship training
Firm investment 
in human capital
THC
Monetary value 
for firm-specific 
training SHC
Share of 
firm-specific 
training*
Firm size
1–9 employees 52884(40521)
2971
(4026)
0.09
(0.17)
10–49 employees 41422(35887)
3042
(3288)
0.13
(0.17)
50–499 employees 39961(31984)
4597
(4566)
0.19
(0.22)
500+ employees 45230(38235)
4979
(3649)
0.21
(0.24)
Vocational field
Metalworking 50398(37085)
3575
(4330)
0.12
(0.20)
Electrical engineering 51159(37299)
3753
(4216)
0.12
(0.19)
Information technology 57272(35471)
5010
(3131)
0.13
(0.13)
Chemicals 36716(28610)
5400
(4336)
0.21
(0.22)
Accommodation and food 40413(30236)
1385
(1420)
0.06
(0.08)
Construction 48147(50754)
3028
(3394)
0.15
(0.27)
Print and media 50219(38826)
2878
(6592)
0.08
(0.16)
Health 59019(32783)
2352
(2264)
0.06
(0.06)
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Firm investment 
in human capital
THC
Monetary value 
for firm-specific 
training SHC
Share of 
firm-specific 
training*
Administrative: sales and distribution 41319(35918)
4021
(5830)
0.14
(0.22)
Administrative: headquarters 36257(36459)
3288
(2995)
0.16
(0.16)
Administrative: banks/insurance 38766(29546)
6266
(3865)
0.25
(0.23)
Other occupations 50181(45912)
1814
(2433)
0.10
(0.20)
Region
East Germany 36911(27826)
2496
(3191)
0.10
(0.13)
West Germany 48334(39423)
3479
(4028)
0.13
(0.19)
Institutional setting
Not bound to collective bargaining 45249(35412)
3436
(4125)
0.13
(0.19)
Bound to collective bargaining 47157(39922)
3172
(3692)
0.12
(0.18)
No works council in the firm 45549(36145)
2932
(3477)
0.11
(0.18)
Works council in the firm 50380(46448)
5494
(5352)
0.19
(0.21)
Total 46240(37812)
3299
(3906)
0.12
(0.18)
Source: BIBB-CBS 2007. Standard deviation in parenthesis; all numbers in €.
* The values in the third column are the weighted averages of the firms’ shares of firm-specific training for each of the 
subgroups. This value differs from the ratios of the averages of SHC and THC, which are given in the first two columns.
As indicated above, we recalculated the share of firm-specific training under the as-
sumption that wages do not reflect the true productivity of workers due to, e.g. la-
bour market frictions. The results of this «sensitivity» analysis are presented in table 
A6. Even under the assumption that worker productivity is 50% higher than the re-
ceived wage (i.e.  φ i 
int = 1.5 *  w i 
int ), we still find only a moderate share of the firm-
specific training component of about 16%. In a final step, we estimate a maximum-
likelihood selection model to assess whether the differences observed in the descrip-
tive statistics also hold when a set of structural variables is controlled for. For this 
purpose, we employ the whole set of firms with the censored part of the model being 
those firms for which information needed for the calculation of the firm-specific 
training component is available. The results of the model show that both exclusion 
restrictions are highly significant in the selection model. Because the employment 
development variable is coded from –2 (strong decrease) to 2 (strong increase), the 
positive coefficient of the exclusion restriction indicates that employment growth in 
firms results in higher external recruitment. The positive coefficient of the second 
continued
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exclusion restriction variable (i.e. whether firms could fill all vacant apprenticeship 
training slots) indicates that firms that were not able to fill all vacant training slots 
have a higher probability of recruiting workers externally. The likelihood ratio test 
of independence of equations (ρ = 0) indicates that selection is not likely to play a 
role in our case. We thus receive support in transferring the analysis of the subsample
to the full sample of training firms. Table 2 shows the respective regression output of 
the model. For reference, in table A5, we also present results of the corresponding 
OLS-regression using only the subsample of recruiting firms.
Table 2: Maximum-likelihood selection model
Share of 
specific 
component
Standard 
error
Recruitment
yes/no
Standard 
error
Firm size:  
Reference «1–9 employees»
10–49 employees 0.025 (0.023) 0.304*** (0.067)
50–499 employees 0.075** (0.031) 0.552*** (0.086)
500+ employees 0.085** (0.039) 0.550*** (0.128)
Vocational field:  
Reference «Construction»
Metalworking –0.034 (0.032) 0.108 (0.126)
Electrical engineering –0.006 (0.034) –0.221* (0.126)
Information technology –0.016 (0.038) –0.235* (0.141)
Chemicals –0.061 (0.042) 0.284* (0.172)
Accommodation and food –0.080** (0.031) –0.068 (0.120)
Print and media –0.050 (0.043) 0.056 (0.170)
Health –0.059 (0.046) –0.143 (0.161)
Administrative: sales/distribution –0.018 (0.033) –0.125 (0.124)
Administrative: headquarters –0.002 (0.031) –0.148 (0.114)
Administrative: banks/insurance 0.065 (0.040) 0.301* (0.158)
Other occupations 0.001 (0.044) –0.075 (0.164)
Region: Reference «East Germany»
West Germany 0.018 (0.015) –0.077 (0.057)
Institutional dummies
Works council in the firm 0.019 (0.021) –0.219*** (0.079)
Bound to collective bargaining 0.013 (0.015) –0.028 (0.056)
Exclusion restrictions
Employment development 0.204*** (0.031)
Unplaced apprenticeships 0.311*** (0.071)
Constant 0.104 (0.067) –0.798*** (0.113)
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Share of 
specific 
component
Standard 
error
Recruitment
yes/no
Standard 
error
atrho –0.022 (0.247)
lnsigma –1.689*** (0.025)
Observations 2958
Observations uncensored 809
Likelihood-ratio test of independent equations (ρ = 0): χ2 (1) = 0.01  Prob > χ2 = 0.9355
Source: BIBB-CBS 2007. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The results of these calculations confirm the descriptive analysis in that they show 
that the firm-specific component of training increases with firm size. The respective 
coefficients of medium and large firms are significant and positive. Furthermore, 
regression results indicate that compared to the occupational field of construction, 
occupations in banking and insurance have a higher firm-specific component, with 
the respective coefficient being just outside the significance level of 10%. On the 
other hand, occupations in the fields of accommodation and food have lower firm-
specific components.
6.	 Concluding	remarks
In this paper, we made use of the BIBB-Cost-Benefit-Survey of 2007 to calculate the 
monetary value of the firm-specific component of apprenticeship training. We ar-
gued that the resources needed to bring externally recruited workers to the produc-
tivity level of internally trained workers provide a good indicator of the magnitude 
of the firm-specific component of such training. Measured as a share of total human 
capital investments, the firm-specific training component is approximately 12%. Re-
calculating the model under the assumption of imperfect labour markets (i.e. the in-
equality of productivity and wages) leads to shares of firm-specific training of not 
more than 16%. These results generally confirm the presumptions made by Acemo-
glu and Pischke and others, who took German apprenticeship training as a reference 
for firm investment in general human capital. The maximum-likelihood selection 
model used in this paper provides some evidence that firm-specificity increases with 
firm size and that some groups of occupations are trained more (or less) firm-specif-
ically than others. Other variables, such as region, collective bargaining and works 
councils, seem to be of no importance in the degree of firm-specificity of training.
The results presented in this paper are important from a policy perspective as they 
confirm that the German apprenticeship system still offers an education that is stand-
ardised and transferable, at least within the same occupation and type of job. The low 
degree of firm-specificity found in this study is surprising, considering that over the 
past two decades, social partners have worked towards a reduction in the degree of 
formalisation in training curricula and have allowed firms more freedom to intro-
duce firm-specific training elements. Conversely, in a number of cases, different 
continued
How large is the firm-specific component of German apprenticeship training? 99
occupations with common sets of tasks and skills were merged, forming a broader 
occupational field and leading to more general curricula. However, the data used in 
this paper do not permit an analysis of the change of firm-specificity over time. 
Newly available individual- and firm-level survey data that provide additional infor-
mation about skill formation and firms’ adjustment processes should facilitate fur-
ther research in this field.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Firms with recruited 
workers Full sample of firms
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Firm size
1–9 employees 0.440 0.497 0.546 0.498
10–49 employees 0.380 0.486 0.329 0.470
50–499 employees 0.169 0.375 0.117 0.321
500+ employees 0.011 0.106 0.008 0.091
Vocational field
Metalworking 0.097 0.296 0.083 0.277
Electrical engineering 0.083 0.276 0.098 0.297
Information technology 0.080 0.272 0.068 0.252
Chemicals 0.026 0.159 0.011 0.102
Accommodation and food 0.120 0.325 0.128 0.334
Construction 0.106 0.307 0.106 0.307
Print and media 0.024 0.154 0.020 0.139
Health 0.103 0.305 0.119 0.324
Administrative: sales and distribution 0.132 0.339 0.138 0.344
Administrative: headquarters 0.169 0.375 0.187 0.390
Administrative: banks/insurance 0.023 0.151 0.016 0.127
Other occupations 0.036 0.187 0.026 0.159
Region
East Germany 0.183 0.387 0.165 0.371
West Germany 0.817 0.387 0.835 0.371
Training organisation
Training centre 0.073 0.260 0.047 0.212
Internal courses 0.312 0.464 0.275 0.447
Institutional setting
Bound to collective bargaining 0.520 0.500 0.540 0.499
Works councils in the firm 0.143 0.350 0.130 0.336
Observations 809 2958
Source: BIBB-CBS 2007
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Table A2: Firm investment in human capital (full apprenticeship)
Firms having recruited workers
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wage costs for trainers in € 38161 35525 0 215106
Costs for infrastructure in € 2606 3268 0 49967
Organisational costs in € 5473 5334 189 42055
Firm investment in human capital in € 46240 37812 1350 223873
Observations 809
Full sample of firms
Wage costs for trainers in € 38125 35383 0 235499
Costs for infrastructure in € 2649 3723 0 58387
Organisational costs in € 5147 5057 0 47437
Firm investment in human capital in € 45921 37378 0 252863
Observations 2958
Source: BIBB-CBS 2007
Table A3: Variables used for calculating the firm-specific training component  
of apprenticeship training
Firms having recruited workers
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Monthly wage internally trained worker in € 1786 527 500 4000
Monthly wage externally recruited workers in € 1804 557 500 3900
Productivity difference between externally recruited 
and internally trained workers (in per cent) 38 22 0 100
Adjustment time in months 4 4 0 36
Days spent in continuing training 21 44 0 243
Costs for fees, etc. of continuing training in € 424 1034 0 9999
Wage costs of continuing training in € 752 1562 0 4715
Firm-specific component of training 3299 3906 0 43727
Observations 809
Source: BIBB-CBS 2007
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Table A4: Correlation of selection variables
Employment 
development
Unplaced 
apprenticeships
Productivity difference between externally recruited 
and internally trained workers (in per cent) 0.03 -0.02
Firm-specific component of training 0.00 0.05
Observations 809
Source: BIBB-CBS 2007
Table A5: OLS-regression model
Share of specific 
component Std. Error
Firm size: Reference «1–9 employees»
10–49 employees 0.026 (0.019)
50–499 employees 0.077*** (0.023)
500+ employees 0.086** (0.033)
Vocational field: Reference «Construction»
Metalworking -0.034 (0.032)
Electrical engineering -0.007 (0.034)
Information technology -0.017 (0.038)
Chemicals -0.060 (0.041)
Accommodation and food -0.080* (0.031)
Print and media -0.050 (0.043)
Health -0.060 (0.046)
Administrative: sales and distribution -0.018 (0.033)
Administrative: headquarters -0.003 (0.031)
Administrative: banks/insurance  0.066 (0.039)
Other occupations  0.000 (0.044)
Region: Reference «East Germany»
West Germany 0.018 (0.015)
Institutional dummies
Works councils in the firm 0.018 (0.020)
Bound to collective bargaining 0.012 (0.015)
Constant 0.099** (0.030)
Observations 809
Source: BIBB-CBS 2007. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A6: Alternative estimation of share  
using hypothetical wage-productivity differentials
Share of specific component Mean Std. Dev.
 φ i 
int =  w i 
int 0.12 0.17
 φ i 
int = 1.1 *  w i 
int 0.13 0.19
 φ i 
int = 1.25 *  w i 
int 0.14 0.20
 φ i 
int = 1.5 *  w i 
int 0.16 0.20
Figure A1: Unemployment and job vacancies in Germany (in 1000s)
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Data source: Federal Employment Ageny, Germany
